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This paper offers a sketch of the life and work of the bolognese circle of professors of law called, in 
some legal manuscripts of the end of thirteenth century, the “moderni”: it was the generation 
active in Bologna between about 1270 and 1305, the years of the establishment and triumph of the 
new government of the city by the popular party. It was not simply a matter of chronology. The 
new generation of doctores, like Lambertinus Ramponi, Pax de Pace, Basacomater de 
Basacomatre, Thomas Guidonis Ubaldini, Gardinus de Gardinis, was really different from the 
previous ones, in their way of thinking and teaching and also in their way of establishing legal 
theory. Emancipated around 1268, they began to take part in judicial affairs in 1269-70. Then they 
taught at the university: they wrote short treatises about legal procedure, and above all they wrote 
a lot of questiones, the most common learning method in law school in the second half of the 13th  
century. After the revolution of 1274 and the ban of the Ghibelline party, they were constantly 
present in the committees of sapientes, charged with reviewing the law, finding the solution for the 
emergencies in the public affairs and receiving the appeals from defendants implicated in political 
trials. 
I will suggest here three perspectives focused on the indissoluble link between juridical culture and 
political power in thirteenth century Bologna professors. First, a brief sketch about the main stages 
of a jurist’s career; second, the role of academic culture, especially the questiones method, in 
shaping the political consciousness of the jurists; and finally, the consequences of their direct 
control over the issues of political justice during the last twenty years of the century.  
 
1. A jurist’s career 
Many scholars have traditionally been concerned with establishing the social context of the jurists 
and their families1. An aristocratic origin has often been assumed, but it has never been thoroughly 
examined. I believe that such presumption is correct but not sufficient to explain the career of a 
jurist in the second half of the thirteenth century. Many jurists’ families were rooted in a working 
and merchant middle class: Martinus Sillimani was the son of a stationer, who meant to promote 
his son through academic studies2; Guillelmus Rombodevino shows in his name his family’s original 
merchant activity3; Spagnolus de Abbati belongs to a rich family of silversmiths, member of the 
moneylenders guild, the Cambio4. Of higher origins were the most significant representatives of the 
Bolognese Guelphism: Pax de Pacibus, Lambertinus Ramponi, and Basacomater de 
Basacomatribus.  
Two features are common to all these jurists, independently of the family origins. First, many had 
close relatives or their own father active in the juridical professions: in other words, these jurists 
represent the second generation of a self-reproducing professional class. Second, a large fraction of 
the jurists belonged to a popular elite pursuing the social promotion of their members through 
                                                                 
 
1 See J. Fried, Die Entstehung des Juristenstandes im 12. Jahrhundert. Zur sozialen Stellung und politischen 
Bedeutung gelehrter Juristen in Bologna und Modena, Köln 1974; E. Cortese, Intorno agli antichi iudices 
toscani e ai caratteri di un ceto medievale , in Id., Scritti giuridici, Spoleto 2000, pp. XX-XX; J.C. Maire Vigueur, 
Gli iudices nelle città comunali: identità ed esperienze politiche, in Federico II e le città italiane , A. Paravicini 
Bagliani, and P. Toubert, eds., Palermo 1994, pp. 161-176.   
2 M. Sarti - M. Fattorini, De Claris archigymnasii bononiensis professoribus a saeculo XI usque ad saeculum XIV, 
tomus I, Bologna 1888-1896, p. 244.  
3 Ibidem, p. 220.  
4 Ibidem, p. 226.  
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political activity. This is what happened in several cases: the relatives of our jurists often held 
communal administrative offices, drawn by the lot by the communal council or popular 
organisations. Sometimes they managed to be elected Antiani, the most important communal 
institution. Politics also allowed the transmission of shared social values from one generation to 
another. The social memory of the family was often deeply marked by this prompt adhesion to the 
popular party. It is the case of the Pax de Pacibus and Lambertinus Ramponi, members of recent 
urban nobility, who were engaged in the defence of the Guelph-popular regime installed in Bologna 
after the Ghibelline ban of 1274, following the battle of Ponte Saint Procolo in which their relatives 
were killed by the Ghibelline faction.In short, social origin does not explain all. It is instead 
necessary to turn to the career of the jurists and their cultural education. The period we may call 
the formative phase begins in late sixties of the thirteenth century, more precisely in the years 
1268-1269. In these two years most of our jurists were emancipated from their parents and began 
a juridical career. In the same year they reached the doctorate degree in law school. Their first 
essays were in arbitration, conducted under the patronage of the older masters, like Rolandinus de 
Romanzi, one of the most powerful jurists in Bologna5: in 1268, for instance, he issued 12 
arbitrations, and many of these were directed to the resolution of political conflicts among the 
renowned urban families6. The same year marks the appearance of Lambertinus Ramponi, who 
and became doctor legum and deals with important mediations between conflicting Bolognese 
families7.  
Pax de Pacis issues his first arbitration in 1269, the year of his emancipatio, and a more important 
one in 1273 in collaboration with Martino da Fano, one of the most famous jurists of his time. 
Martino’s patronage may have opened the road to politics for him: It is in fact an arbitration within 
the Lambertini family 8. At the same time he obtains his doctorate, but shortly thereafter his life 
would take a decisive turn towards active politics. His father and uncle had died fighting for the 
Geremea faction in the battle of Ponte San Procolo in 1274. In the eighties he continues his 
arbitration activity, but his prestige is now so high that his mere presence confers prestige to an 
arbitration9.  
Basacomater de Basacomatri obtains his doctorate in 1269; being the most prominent member of 
the family he must settle the disputes with the enemies of his family, in this case the Lambertini of 
the Gruamonte branch who had killed his brother10. Guillelmus de Rombodivino makes his 
appearance as a doctor legum in 1269 and in the same year drafts a consilium together with 
Rolandinus de Romanzi11. Romanzi issued another consilium about the banished with 
Basacomater and Thomas de Piperata in 127112. Thomas Guidonis Ubaldini, professor of law, 
appears in 1269. Finally there is Gardinus de Gardinis, iudex until 1280 and doctor since 1283 
(hence late compared to the others); his career is partly different, since his role as a iudex keeps 
                                                                 
 
5 A consilium by Rolandino dei Romanzi of 1248 has survived which puts the date back compared to Sarti, 
Zaccagnini, Notizie inedite, p. 175: it was not necessary to be a doctor, as it instead postulated by Zaccagnini, 
edito p. 182: the consilium is requested by the podestà. See also the consilium published by C. Mesini, Nuovo 
contributo alla storia di Rolandino dei Romanzi, in Studi e memorie, XIV 1938, 197 -220. 
6 Chartularium studii bononiensis. Documenti per la storia dell’università di Bologna dalle origini fino al secolo 
XV, vol. VIII, Memoriali del comune di Bologna anno 1268, Bologna 1927  
7 See Chartularium 1268, cit. n. 197, p. 101 arbitration between two family groups, Reglagatis and Aldevrandi; 
Much more important are the arbitrations contained in Chartularium, vol. IX, Bologna 1931, Memoriali del 
1286, n. XCI, p. 52, CLXII, p. 94, between Gabrielli and Mariscotti; n. CCLXIX, p. 162 between two members of 
Romanzi family.  
8 The 1273 arbitration, contained in the memoriale  by Amodei de Sardellis, is mentioned by Sarti- Fattorini, p. 
248.  
9 Chartularium, vol. IX, 1286: He is a witness on pp. 38, 48, 54, 59, 96, 150, 201, 227; arbiter on pp. 103, 194, 
247 .  
10 Sarti-Fattorini, p. 239.  
11 Chartularium vol. I, Bologna 1909, n. CLI, p. 154.  
12 Chartularium vol. I, CLII, p. 155, Sarti-Fattorini date it at 1269.  
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him busy for a long time in the communal offices such as the depositarius (a financial office) and 
the bannitorum office13.  
 
The quality of their involvement in the political life is not so obvious. A fact is immediately evident: 
the bolognese iuris professores and doctores legum did not hold formal governmental offices. They 
never were Antiani of the Popolo, or ministrale of the popular guilds: such offices were instead 
consistently held by the members of the great families of the Mercanzia and Cambio guilds, the 
most important and richest guilds of the Bolognese Popolo. A different kind of penetration in the 
political structures thus appears, and an actual sharing of the power with the elite of the Popolo.  
Primarily, our professors seemed to prefer economic and financial control offices: like procurator, 
defensor averis. Moreover, they were sometimes supervisors of the officium banditi, which 
assured them a wide control over all quarrels about the use and abuse of bans by the foreign 
magistrates, the podestà and the Captain of the people. They owned another monopoly in the 
judicial field: The office of “approbatores fideiussorum”, meaning that whoever wanted to act as a 
guarantor needed to be examined by approbatores.  
The jurists’ political role changed after 1274-1277, a long period of internal disorder caused by the 
two general bans of the Ghibelline families. The loyalty to the new popular and Guelph regime was 
considered as a requisite to be admitted to the communal institutions. On the contrary, to be 
recognized as a Ghibelline supporter became dangerous: Spagnolus Abbatis was exiled, Martinus 
Sillimani was permitted to remain, but only to teach. Although the composition of the bolognese 
Popolo was so complex that it is dangerous to explain it by the one-dimensional idea of “party”, 
undoubtedly the highest level jurists such as doctores and professores formed a homogeneous 
group within the Popolo, able to represent the commune in the most serious emergencies. 
Consider two cases: in 1278 the act of obedience by Bologna to the Pope was presented by 
Antolinus de Manzolino doctor legis, Rolandinus de Romanzi, Thomas Guidonis Ubaldini and Pax 
de Pacibus mentioned as iuris civilis professores14. In 1280 the exceptional cabinet of eight 
consules in charge during the external conflict with Ferrara, was composed by Pax de Pacibus, 
Lambertinus Ramponi, Guillelmus Rombodivino, Thomas Guidonis Ubaldini, Gardinus de 
Gardinis.  
It was not merely a matter of juridical competence. The jurists became the real reference for every 
political crisis of the commune: from the administration of ordinary affairs, to the supervision over 
political trials against Ghibellines and the leading of the commune during war time. During two 
decades the jurists played an ambiguous and peculiar role. On one hand, they directed the 
consulting activity in judicial and political matters; on the other, they continued to teach in the law 
school and to maintain the cultural pre-eminence about the interpretation of the law. Let us begin 
from the latter point.  
 
2. Juridical culture and justice.  
As we have seen in the introductory note this generation of Bolognese jurists was identified in the 
libri magni questionum as the moderni. What was the peculiarity of this generation? First, the 
extensive use of questiones as teaching and learning method. They compiled a lot of questiones, 
organized in short collections and in official anthologies published by the university’s stationer. 
The first collections of questiones, as it is well known, date back to the mid twelfth century and 
accompany the development of the Bolognese studium and the birth of the first French and 
Provençal universities15. Their origin is probably in the systematic application of doubt to the law 
                                                                 
 
13 Sarti - Fattorini, cit., p. 264. 
14 Chartularium, vol. I, , n. XLVII, p. 41-42.  
15 Many collections that were originally attributed to the Bolognese masters were later traced back to the French-
Provençal milieu by A.Gouron, Note sur les collections de Quaestiones reportatae chez les civilistes du XIIe 
siècle , in “Houd Voet bij stuk”, Xenia iuris historiae G. Van Dievoet oblata, eds. F. Stevens and D. Van den 
Auwelee, Leuven 1990, pp. 55-66. 
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par excellence, the Justinianian Corpus iuris, and exploits the tools of dialectics to resolve the 
contradictions of the text16. But when the method assumes its final form, with pro, contra and 
solutio, it naturally highlights the differences in opinion and the scientific disagreements between 
the masters. The same subject is often deliberately taken up by several masters to underline the 
distance from one’s predecessor or competitor17.  
During the thirteenth century the quaestio improves also as a teaching method: its role grows 
compared to the more traditional lecture18, its dialectic structure becomes complete, and it gets 
classified in several conceptual categories according to the nature of the object of the dispute 
(legittima, de facto emergens) or the scholarly origin (q. disputata), or the phases of the academic 
year (mercuriales, dominicales)19. The manner and timing for conducting the questiones are 
established by the statutes, prescribing that a copy of the texts debated in the school were to be 
given to the stationari for the composition of official collections20. From 1270 it becomes 
mandatory for all teachers at the Bologna University to debate at least once a year, and the 
number of quaestiones increases considerably.  
After the second half of the thirteenth century the jurists slowly changed the nature of the cases 
examined in their questiones. They dropped the theoretical and scholarly cases for the most 
current problems presented by the communal law. I would like to direct my attention to the logical 
and ideological meaning of the questiones applied to the statutes of Italian communes. The questio 
is first of all an inquiry about the degree of coherence and legitimacy of a particular law included in 
the statute book.  
An overwhelming majority of questiones by the University masters, both in Bologna and 
elsewhere, concerned problems arising from reading the statutes, from the stratified but 
uncoordinated rules accumulated in the communal books without any logical order and, most 
important, lacking legitimacy with respect to the text of corpus iuris. The statute law was valid 
because in force, but openly criticisable and often censurable. The position of the professors on this 
point was extremely clear. To comply with the statute does not make it immutable nor confers to it 
the validity of a lex, autonomous from the political arena. It implies a systematic doubt about the 
“new law” of the cities. No provision taken by the communal government was exempt from the 
examination by the iuris professor. The formulation of the casus tended to stress the ambiguities 
in the meaning of the single words, by showing the contradiction in terms, the conflict with other 
norms, and the uncertain boundaries between different meanings of the same concept. Finally, 
jurists fought against the simplification of legal language as opposed to a complex and changing 
reality. It needed a continuous work of adaptation and interpretation. However the criteria of this 
                                                                 
 
16 H. Kantorowicz, The quaestiones disputatae of the Glossators, in Id., Rechtshistorische Schriften, hrg. H. 
Coing, G. Immel, Karlsruhe 1970, pp. 137 -184; G. Fransen, Les questions disputées dans les facultés de droit, in 
Les questions disputées et les questions quodlibétiques dans les facultés de thèologie, de droit et de médicine , 
Brepols 1985, pp. 225-277; A. Errera, La quaestio  medievale e i glossatori bolognesi, in “Studi senesi”, 108 
(1996), pp. 490-530; M. Bellomo, I fatti e il diritto. Tra le certezze e i dubbi dei giuristi medievali (secoli XIII-
XIV), Roma 2000.  
17 See the cases of Pillio and Azzone in C. Belloni, Le questioni civ ilistiche del secolo XII, Da Bulgaro a Pillio da 
Medicina e Azzone , Ius commune, 43, Frankfurt an Main, 1989. Several disputes are related by Odofredo, cfr. N. 
Tamassia, Odofredo. Studio storico giuridico, in id., Scritti di storia giuridica, Padova 1967, pp.  372-373. 
18 Such a suggestion, especially after the glossa accursiana which had limited the innovation rate in the genre, is 
put forward by F. Soertemeer, Les “commenta” ou “lecturae”, cit., p. 54-55.  
19 M. Bellomo, “Legere, repetere disputare”. Introduzione ad una ricerca sulle “Quaestiones” civilistiche, in 
Aspetti dell’insegnamento giuridico nelle università medievali, I Le “Quaestiones disputatae”, Reggio Calabria 
1974 and Fransen, Les questions diputées, although with some substantial divergences in the classification 
criteria.  
20 E. Montanos Ferrin, Las “quaestiones Disputatae” en los estatutos universitarios medievales, in Die Kunst der 
Disputation. Probleme der Rechtauslegung und Rechtsanwendung im 13. Und 14. Jahrhundert, a cura di M. 
Bellomo, Münich 1997, pp. 157 -203, for the questiones in the Bolognese statutes p. 166 ff.  
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interpretation were inspired by an external system of logical and juridical references, that is by the 
Roman law. 
 
We will examine two main spheres of uncertainty: the meaning of the words (semantic confusion 
sphere) and the case of people whose condition changes suddenly.  
Let us read some examples of the first type. The statute forbids the export of grain out of the 
contado, but if someone was caught with a sack of flour (not grain), does he deserve to be punished 
all the same21? Or a similar case: to find someone with two donkeys loaded with sacks of flour near 
the gates of town, does it mean that he is smuggling them out22?  
Yet another example is the famous question best known as “an die vel de nocte”: the statute called 
for different fines for crimes committed by day or by night: but if someone committed a crime at 
dusk, which of the two fines should be inflicted23? 
The field of synonymy and apparent similarities involved highly non-trivial issues of logic, such as 
the choice of an instrument: in the case of the day/night problem, should an ancient Roman rule be 
adopted, that was in favour of the perpetrator (dusk was to be considered on the same footing as 
daylight, for which the penalty was lighter); or rather, as Guido da Suzzara recommends, followed 
by many others, a purely logical inference should be used, named “a contrario sensu”: if the sun is 
not in the sky, then it cannot be daytime, therefore it is night time and the penalty is heavier24; or 
yet another variant, developed by Martino Sillimani, based on a complex reasoning about the 
nature of the penalty, and which results in a benign interpretation which excludes the doubling of 
the penalty25? 
Moreover a very real dispute was opened concerning the legitimacy of the interpretation: who is to 
decide whether blava and flour are one and the same thing? The judge or the lawmakers? And 
moreover, based on what arguments can different things and facts be grouped together? Is a 
simple lexical analogy enough, or is a specific judgement required? Clearly these questions cast 
doubt on the ability itself of the judge to solve the problems posed by the statutes.  
Another type of question concerns doubts about the condition of a person, especially in the case of 
change of civil status. If someone was convicted of homicide and afterward took religious vows, 
may the judge bring him to trial for the murder or is the defendant protected by the ecclesiastical 
privilege? Similar considerations apply to the banished, whose legal status was subject to sudden 
change at any moment.  
The main problems in this case were concerned with changes in the political orientation of the 
commune. The most frequent case regards goods seized from the banished: often the podestà 
forced the banished’s debtors, or his farmers, to pay their debts to the commune; if soon 
afterwards the commune pardons the banished, or reaches an agreement with him, can he collect 
again the debts paid to the commune? The problem is involved because a fundamental mechanism 
of the city legislation on political bandits, such as the property confiscation, is put under scrutiny, 
and its implicit illegitimate content is exposed: to radically modify the individual property rights is 
                                                                 
 
21 Alberti Gandini Quaestiones statutorum, edited by A.Solmi, in “Bibliotheca Iuridica Medii Aevi”, vol. III, 
Bologna 1901, pp. 157 -280, n.XIX p. 165: the Vercelli statute prohibits the export of blavam but “contigit quod 
aliquis portabat farinam”.  
22 Quaestiones statutorum, n. XX, “idem, aliquis reperitur in via portas bladum super equum”.  
23 E. Montanos Ferrin, “An de die vel de nocte”,  in “Rivista internazionale di diritto comune”, 7 (1998), pp. 49-80; 
Bellomo, I fatti e il diritto ,  pp.573-581.  
24 F. Martino, “Argumenta ex legibus”,  in Die Kunst der Disputation. pp. 147 -156, here p. 154. The example well 
illustrates the problems related “to the extension of the statute provisions to an omitted case”; however the use 
of a logical locus is a sign of a wider process of “incorporation of the logical ‘modi arguendi’ in the world of the 
law”. See also M. Bellomo, “Loci locales” e forme del pensiero giuridico in alcuni testi dei secoli XIII e XIV, in 
“Rivista di storia del diritto italiano”, 47 (1974), pp. 5-18.  
25 In Montanos Ferrìn, “An de die vel de nocte”,  p. 69: the solution, after discussing at length whether the part of 
the penalty allotted to the public institution or the compensation due to the private subject should be doubled, 
concludes that the statute is unclear, and therefore chooses the most favourable interpretation.  
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always an arbitrary act, decided in a moment of emergency. As soon as the political equilibrium, 
always very changeable in communal cities, is modified, such an act reveals itself as juridically 
unfounded and a source of new conflicts (between the debtors and the commune, or between the 
banished who has been pardoned and his debtors). The cases examined here are not merely 
abstract: they reflect real objections the lawyer could raise at the trial. The questiones collections 
were accessible by a large number of people interested in the trial, and with high probability it was 
the lawyers who could exploit at best the ambiguities of the language. Moreover, the structure of 
the doubt involves a specific part of the trial representation activity, that is the raising of an 
objection to the prosecution, based on a discrepancy between the fact ascribed and what is 
specified by the statute. To show the limits of legal terms meant to deny the charge. The more 
objections that were raised to the judge, the more the latter had to address the local lawyers for 
legal consulting. This explains the main interest of law professors in compiling a great number of 
questiones. 
A core of authors, in particular, is consistently propagated through the main volumes - the two libri 
magni, mss S. Pietro 29a, Chigi VIII. 24526, the Rome State Archive miscellanea 100427  and the 
Olumuc manuscript28, the Florence manuscript29, the Vittorio Emanuele 151130 - : it is the so-
called “moderni” generation, consisting, first of all, of several great masters, leaders in the second 
half of the thirteenth century, such as Guidus de Suzzara (who died in the seventies); Martinus da 
Fano31, Iacopus d’Arena, Dinus del Mugello; and the Bolognese masters mentioned above, 
Martinus Sillimani32, Lambertinus Ramponi, Thomas de Piperata, Basacomater de Basacomatre, 
Albertus domini Odofredi, Pax de Pacis. These are the ones who use questiones with the highest 
confidence, and extend the practice of doubt to new subjects and juridical fields.  
Many casus questionum are concerned with scholarly civil law subjects, reflecting their activity as 
lawyers and legal representatives in the many property issues that kept dividing the great city 
families with continuous fights: wills, loans, inheritances supplied ample matter of debate. But 
besides these, the trial cases became relevant, with special attention paid to the juridical 
intermediation aspects such as the role of the legal representative, the right to a defence, and the 
duties of the guarantor: whether private notaries could draft testimonies in the absence of the 
accuser33, whether the creditor could present a single charge against many debtors34; whether the 
podestà could demand the penalty from the guarantors even if the latter produced the accused 
again35; whether a friend, who appears to plead cause absentie must also commit himself to 
                                                                 
 
26 Accurately described in Bellomo, I fatti e il diritto , op. cit.  
27 S. Caprioli, La miscellanea romana dell’Archivio di Stato (ms 1004), in G. D’Amelio, A. Campitelli, S. Caprioli, 
F. Martino, Studi sulle quaestiones civilistiche disputate nelle università medievali, Reggio Calabria 1974, pp. 
118-214. 
28 F. Martino, Giuristi di scuola e pratici del diritto a Reggio e a Padova, il ms Olomuc c.o 40, in “Quaderni 
catanesi di studi classici e medievali, a.VIII, n.16 (1986), pp. 423-445. G. Murano ,”Liber questionum in petiis”. 
Osservazioni sul ms. Darmstadt 853, in “Studi medievali”, serie III, XXXIII, II (1992), pp. 645-675.  
29 F. Martino, Le quaestiones del manoscritto Firenze, Biblioteca Riccardiana, 744, in “Rivista internazionale di 
diritto comune”, 2 (1991), pp. 175-222.  
30 L. Martinoli Santini - P. Peruzzi, Catalogo delle opere giuridiche contenute nel ms Vittorio Emanuele 1511 
della biblioteca Centrale di Roma, in “Rivista internazionale di diritto comune”, 7 (1996), pp. 217-305. 
31 About his works see N. Sarti, Martino da Fano e suoi “notabilia super institutionibus” (ms Città del Vaticano, 
B.V. Urb. Lat. 156), in “Rivista di storia del diritto italiano”, LXIX (1996), pp. 115-153.  
32 F.Migliorino, “Dominus meus in legibus”: the search for a liber quaestionum of Martinus Sillimani, in The two 
laws. Studies in medieval Legal History dedicated to Stephan Kuttner, ed. L.Mayali, S. A. Tibbetts, Washington 
1990, pp. 121 -151. 
33 By Pax de Pace, in F.Martino, Quaestiones civilistiche disputate a Bologna negli ultimi due decenni del secolo 
XIII. Studio sui manoscritti Leipzig U.B. 992 e Paris B.N. Lat. 4489, in Studi sulle questioni civilistiche disputate 
nelle università medievali, cit., p. 242. 
34 By Lambertinus Ramponi, in Martino, Quaestiones civilistiche cit., p. 243.  
35 Thomas de Piperata’s answer is in the negative, in Martino, Le questiones civilistiche, p. 249; drawn upon by 
Alberto Gandino, Giovanni d’Andrea and Alberico da Rosciate.  
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produce the accused36; and, in general, whether a legal representative was admissible in non-
capital criminal trials: Martino Sillimani’s answer is clear: “quod in criminalibus non capitalibus 
procurator indistincte admittitur”37.These were important problems in the professional practice, 
as demonstrated by the actual working of the communal judicial system.  
The foreign magistrates often asked the sapientes about problems in procedure and in law. 
Sometimes they were required to do so; sometimes they preferred to base their sentence on the 
jurist’s opinion, in order to avoid objections. Contrary to common opinion, legal consulting was far 
from being based merely on technical knowledge. The monopoly of interpretation of law exerted by 
the jurists changed into a real judicial power, because the consilium sapientis was able to 
determine the judge’s sentence38. The case of the Bolognese jurists’ consilia shows the political 
significance of the subjects handled by professors.  
The basic feature of the jurists’ interventions is the tireless defence of the trial’s formalities. In 
some cases the basic principles of the trial were involved, as in the consilium by two legum 
doctores, Bonagratia Armanni Pascipoveri and Antolinus de Manzolino, who in 1286 ruled that 
the judge could not force a prosecutor to advance the trial against his own will, since both the 
common law and the statute forbade it:  
 
super dicta accusatione non possit procedi invito vel non instante dicto accusatore...cum nemo 
invitus agere vel accusare cogatur39.  
 
It was a weighty decision, limiting the official powers of the podestà. In most cases failure to follow 
the procedural formalities becomes the main reason to invalidate a trial. In a small collection of 
consilia concerning trials ended in the arrest or exile of the accused, kept in the podestà’s files of 
1292, we get an outline of the possible reasons of annulment40, usually because the solempnitates 
called for by the statute were omitted: thus two councillors, Iohannes de Artimixis and Nicolaus de 
Soldareris, ordered a bandit to be released because, when summoned, he was called by his first 
name only, and not by last name, as prescribed by the statute. Pax de Pace and Thomas domini 
Ubaldini justify another release with the absence of witnesses at the moment the ban was 
declared; in the same way Albertus domini Odofredi, Basacomater de Basacomatri and 
Lambertinus Ramponi, in a collective consilium, annul another ban for lack of summons.  
It could appear as a formalistic intervention, typical of a lawyer, but things are not so simple. The 
defence of the trial form originated from a choice that was cultural and political at the same time: 
cultural, because the trial was seen as a sequence of acts to be performed according to a mandatory 
ordo iuris requiring a precise series of steps, under penalty of annulment of the whole trial; and 
                                                                 
 
36 Again by Piperata, Ibidem, pp. 254-255, and once again the answer is in the negative, because actually the 
friend non plene defendat the accused, but simply justifies him temporarily.  
37 By Martino Sillimani as many as 46 questiones survive in the manuscript As Pietro 29: 11 correspond to Chigi 
VIII, 20 were drawn upon by Giovanni d’Andrea and 13 by Alberico da Rosciate. Also by Martino Sillimani are 
32 questiones in VE 1511, of which only 6 explicitly trial-related, including one, mentioned above, about the 
intervention of the legal representative.  
38 A. Belloni, Quaestiones e consilia. Agli inizi della prassi consigliare , in I. Baumgärtner (Hg.), Consilia in späten 
Mittelater. Zum historischen Aussagewert einer Quellengattung, Sigmaringen 1995, pp. 19-32; G. Rossi, 
Consilium sapientis iudiciale , Milano 1958; M. Ascheri, Le fonti e la flessibilità del diritto comune: il paradosso 
del consilium sapientis in Legal consulting in the civ il law tradition, ed. by M. Ascheri, I. Baumgärtner, J. 
Kirshner, Berkeley 1999, pp. 11-54. For Milan see A. Padoa Schioppa, La giustizia milanese nella prima età 
viscontea, in Ius Mediolani. Studi di storia del diritto offerti dagli allievi a Giulio Vismara, Milano 1996, pp. 1 -
46.  
39 Archivio di Stato di Bologna (=ASBo), Comune , Governo  Podestà, Giudici ad maleficia, Inquisitiones 1286, II, 
reg. 14, c. 8v.  
40 ASBo, Curia del podestà, Carte di Corredo, busta 19. It is a pergamenenous sheet, readapted as a book cover, 
containing six consilia about banishments, collected into a “liber ubi sunt scripta consilia data tempore domini 
Rubei de la Tosa potestatis Bononie”, the podestà had been in office in 1292.  
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political, because once this conception of the trial as a sequence was established, the inspection of 
formalities became a formidable weapon to put pressure on the foreign judges of the podestà ‘s 
familia.  
Let us examine two examples chosen from the Tractatus de Maleficiis, written by Alberto 
Gandino after a long career as a professional judge in foreign familie of podestà41. During the two 
years he spent in Bologna, in 1289 and 1294, he resorted many times to professors’ legal 
consulting. He cites 12 times Lambertinus Ramponi, 4 times Rolandinus de Romanzi, and one each 
Bonagratia Armanni Pascipoveri and Thomas Ubaldini Malavolti. Often the occasion for these 
direct relations was provided by a doubt about the procedure, solved by asking a legum doctor for 
a consilium. However, when reading between the lines, it is possible to notice a difference in 
methods and ideas between Gandino and his counsellors, probably reflecting true doctrinal conflicts 
about the procedure. 
The first case I want to point out concerns the legal “proxi”. Gandino intended to limit the faculty 
of defendants to be represented by professional lawyers: so he agreed with an ancient Roman 
regula iuris that forbade it in case of capital crimes. But the reality was more complex42. Gandino 
recalls a controversial case that took place in Bologna: if a man was charged with a crime the 
Roman law punished with death, and the communal statute only with a pecuniary fine, could the 
defendant appoint a lawyer? Gandino would refuse to grant it. But, on the contrary, Lambertinus 
Ramponi and others doctores were in favour of electing a legal representative43. The same opinion 
was expressed in two other questiones, maybe two consilia presented by Lambertinus Ramponi 
itself to the podestà. In short, the strong protection the jurists were able to assure to the right of 
defence contrasted with the new, harsher concept of justice advanced by Gandino. Also for a 
serious crimes, for which torture could be inflicted, the accused has the right to present a defence, 
according to Lambertinus Ramponi44.  
Another case of conflict demonstrates this difference. Gandino had to examine a case of untrue 
testimony (“falsum dixerunt dolose”) given during an inquisition that the judge could not conduct, 
since the act was not included in the list of crimes allowed by statute to be investigated. In other 
words, Gandino had gone too far in his duty and the trial was probably invalidated. Nevertheless 
Gandino would punish the witness for forgery, but the podestà (and not Gandino) would again seek 
advice from Lambertinus Ramponi, Ubaldinus de Malavoltis and some other doctores. The 
consilium was once more against Gandino’s decision: they refused to punish them because the 
effect of the forgery was null45. However in the Tractatus Gandino disagrees with this response 
and argues the two witnesses must be convicted “quia in se ipsis maleficium consumatum est”. 
The contrast between Gandino and the doctores was substantial because the doctores considered 
the formal correctness of the procedure, while Gandino concentrated his thoughts on the crime 
                                                                 
 
41 H Kantorowicz, Albertus Gandinus und das Strafrecht der Scholastick Zweiter Band, Die Theorie. Kritische 
Ausgabe des Tractatus de maleficiis, Berlin 1926, = Tractatus de maleficis. On Gandino see D. Quaglioni, Alberto 
Gandino e le origini della trattatistica penale , in “Materiali per una storia della cultura giuridica”, a. XXIX, 1 
(1999), pp. 49-63. 
42 Tractatus de maleficiis, p. 112. The legal representative can be present only in the less serious cases, not 
involving a pena sanguinis; but not in serious cases “quare procurator in his casibus intervenire non possit quia 
sententia, que ferenda est in persona domini, ferretur in persona procuratoris”.  
43 Tractatus de maleficiis, p. 119. In case of contrast, the statute prevails: “Nam si statutum simpliciter dicat 
quod qui homicidium fecerit solvat pro pena M. librarum, tunc dicunt procuratorem posse intervenire ad totam 
causam per iura primo allegata”.  
44 Tractratus de maleficiis, p. 165: “Dicatis quod defensio prius sit danda, maxime quando tale quid allegatur 
probari, quo probato iste Titius non debet ad tormenta poni. Et super hoc mihi consuluit Bononie dominus 
Lambertus Ramponi”.  
45 Tractatus de maleficiis, p. 338: “qui deliberato consilium dixerunt dictos testes pena falsi non teneri 
rationibus preallegatis”.  
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itself: since it had been committed, it had to be sanctioned, like Dinus del Mugello wrote in his 
lectures46.  
 
3. Justice and politics  
In the meantime the same jurists were members of the most important committees of sapientes 
named by the council. The role of these special committees was well known after 1282. As we have 
already seen, the enactment of anti-Ghibelline laws and the confiscation of a lot of the properties of 
the banished caused new social and juridical tensions. On one hand, the professors led the 
reviewing process of the political laws; on the other they monopolised the consulting activity in 
political trials celebrated by the Captain of the People, whose task was to receive accusations 
against the Lambertazzi and to investigate the banished. In spite of the violence of the civil fights, 
the number of indictments against the Lambertazzi remained surprisingly low. As Giuliano Milani 
has shown in his review on political justice in the eighties, the average number of trials against the 
banished was about 15 per year47. Moreover the procedure followed the ordinary justice 
mechanisms: the accusers had to prove their counts of indictment, while the defendants were 
allowed to present witnesses and justifications. It is not surprising that most trials resulted in 
acquittals.  
Judicial actions regarded also another subject: the distribution of property confiscated to the 
Lambertazzi. Many citizens were obliged to accept an allotment of land belonging to the banished 
families, assigned by the lot in the communal council. Thus they became landowners and they were 
forced to pay communal taxes over these new properties. A lot of quarrels arose against such an 
arbitrary anti-Ghibelline policy. Often it was the former owner who objected to the legitimacy of 
confiscation: because he was not listed as a Lambertazzo, or he bought the land before the seller 
was punished with the political ban. But in many cases the new owners themselves objected to the 
allotment: They complained about the infertility of the fields or the actual type of cultivation that 
was different from the one recorded in the register of land property.  
What is especially interesting is that the decisions in all these cases were assigned to the jurists 
appointed by the Captain’s judges to evaluate the legitimacy of the quarrel through a legal 
consulting. To draft consilia became the most relevant judicial activity accomplished by professors, 
doctores legum and simple judges.  
The size of the phenomenon is macroscopic, as my research will demostrate: It was a matter of 
hundreds of consilia presented by hundreds of jurists. I don’t think I am exaggerating when 
considering this consulting as a kind of informal “jurisdiction” that overlapped the captain’ s 
competence over the banished.  
In the heading of one of the first consilia registers, by the 1281 captain, it is clearly written that the 
judge “carries out” the consilia:  
 
Liber sententiarum latorum et pronuntiatorum per dominum Bernardinum de Medecis 
iudicem et assessorem nobilis viri domini Hugolini quondam domini Iacobini Rubei honorabilis 
capitanei comunis et Populi Bononie exequendo formam consiliorum infrascriptorum48. 
 
With three main consequences: First, the jurists held the actual control of political justice. The 
councillors judged based on the acquired evidence and could examine and accept further evidence: 
                                                                 
 
46 About the concept of crime as an offense to the respublica see M. Sbriccoli, “Vidi communiter observari”. 
L’emersione di un ordine penale pubblico nelle città italiane del secolo XIII, in “Quaderni fiorentini”, 27 (1998), 
pp. 231 -268. About the principle of necessary punishment see R. Fraher, The theoretical justification for the 
new criminal law of the high middle ages: “rei publice interest ne crimina remaneant impunita”, in “The 
University of Illinois law review”, 1984, pp. 577-595.  
47 G. Milani, Dalla ritorsione al controllo. Elaborazione e applicazione del programma antighibellino a Bologna 
alla fine del Duecento , in Quaderni storici, 94 (1997), pp. 43-74.  
48 ASBo, Capitano del Popolo , Giudici del Capitano , reg. 13, 1281, c.1r.  
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in practice, they interfered in the actual building of the sentence that the ordinary judge was not 
able to deliver. In 1285, Basacomater de Basacomatri delivers a consilium about a lawsuit 
between two members of the Leoni societas elected as ministrali for the same semester, which is 
actually a sentence, delivered after a true hearing: “hostenditur eum probasse nobis in 
contraditorio iudicio”49. In another, the councillors are required to express themselves about the 
legitimacy of an accusation through summons and decide the case should not be tried “visis et 
examinatis testibus”50. However in many lawsuits, and especially in the Captain’s ex-officio trials, 
the offender’s counsel can raise an objection about the validity of the summons or the correctness 
of the evidence, and in these cases the councillor is involved, who in most cases invalidates the 
trial51.  
Second, the group of sapientes could modify the allotment made by the communal council. It is 
true that a large part of the measures against the banished was taken by the council; nevertheless 
it seems that the jurists, especially Pax de Pacis, had the power to correct mistakes made in the 
identification of a person or in the inscription of the lands contested in the Register of confiscated 
property. In some trials of 1287 the counsel for the S. Maria Maddalena monastery challenges the 
allotment of a land declared exempt by a previous consilium by Pax de Pacis, and demands the 
previous ruling to be respected. The councillor, in this case Pax himself, confirms his own ruling52. 
Third, they imposed their ideological and juridical criteria. In the property trials the contrast is 
clear between the legally acquired (de iure) possessions and the new form of possession derived 
from coerced distribution of the land. Each time these two types of possession clashed, the jurists 
preferred the legal one. When a defendant could prove his rights by a legal contract, drawn up by a 
notary, generally he was recognized as the rightful owner in spite of any possible allotment 
assigned by the communal council53. In the case of trials against a person, the principles upheld by 
                                                                 
 
49 ASBo, Capitano del Popolo, Giudici del Capitano , reg 72, c.61v. In another trial, Capitano del Popolo , reg. 98 
1287, c.33v, two judges allot a land “cum probatum sit per testes dictam dominam tenere et possidere iuxto 
titulo dictum petium terre et dominum Iohanninum quondam patrem ipsius tenuisse et possidisse per multos 
annos”.  
50) ASbo, Capitano del Popolo , reg. 99, 1287, c. 28r: “In Christi nomine super premissa notificatione cuius tenor 
talis est notificatur vobis domino Capitaneo Populi bononiensi et vobis domino Roberto Mascharonis iudicis et 
cetera, consilium dominorum Liazarii de Liazariis et Iacobi de Tencharariis et mei Brandalexii de Gozadinis est 
tale vixis et examinatis testibus receptis contra Ugolinum Guezii super notificatione facta de ipso quod per vos 
dominum Rodulfum pronuncetur non esse probatum contra dictum Ugolinum et in dicta notificatione non esse 
procedendum”.  
51 Examples from the same book 99 of 1287. At c. 43v Pax de Pace legum doctor rules “quod dictus Rodulfus a 
dicta notificatione seu peticione absolvatur et hoc cum probatum sit per testes per eum.. ipsum esse civem 
civitatis bon”.  
Ibidem, c.59r, Tranchedinus de Sabadinis and Pax de Pacibus legum doctor issue another consilium taking the 
form of a verdict: “tale est quod predictus Petronius non reperiatur confinatus a tempore Ugolini de Rubeis c itra 
nec eo tempore, quod non possit condempnari sed in … absolutionis sit et absolvi debeat”.  
Ibidem, c. 64 it is Bonincontro degli Ospedali, famous decretist, who judges the evidence in a consilium: “est tale 
quod Iohannes Ugolini Usbergensis de cappella s. Nicolai de Albanis, visis et diligenter examinatis actis cause et 
testibus productis plene ad sui defensionem probatum de iure suo, et contra ipsum plene non fuit probatum” 
52 ASBo, Capitano del Popolo , reg. 98, 1287, c. 20r: “consilium tale est quod p redicta petia terre prative libere et 
pacifice per vos pronuntietur relaxari predicte domine Adelaxie et Nicholao Bonvixini sindico et procuratori”. 
Hence Pax de Pace had ordered a correction in the allotment of the land, as another consilium by Bonagratia 
Armanni Pascipoveri issued in the same year demonstrates, Ibidem c. 28r: here the contrast is between the per 
breve allotment to some Azolinus and Pax’s sentence favouring the plaintiff Amadore. The councillor favours 
Amadore and annuls the per breve allotment. Similar cases at c. 32r and 41v. 
53 An example can be found in a consilium by Basacomater: ASBo, Capitano del Popolo , 1281, c. 1v Basacomater 
de Basacomatribus legum doctor about a petition to delete land from the bandits’ books: it appears that dictam 
terra vineata pertinere ad dictam dominam Mariam titullo emptionis in ea facte and is not among the 




the jurists were even more ideological. Moreover the consultants did not limit their survey to the 
correctness of the procedure: they verified the evidence, had the power to exclude or accept 
witnesses, and eventually decided about the guilt or innocence of the accused.  
Let me show an interesting consilium drafted by a professor mentioned above. Just like in the 
Gandino’s question, one of the central themes of the consilia was the right to a defence and a fair 
trial. In a trial against two confined people, the accuser, a quite famous notary named Iohannes de 
Predamala, objected that the defendants could not have a lawyer according to the special law 
approved by the Popolo. The judge did not rule on the issue, and asked Thomas Guidonis Ubaldini 
to do so. Thomas had no doubt: the Roman law allowed the defendant to be represented by a 
lawyer if forced to be contumacious (and this was the case, because the two accused were confined 
in a village); and above all, a general rule suggested that is more right and lawful (iustius) to allow 
the defence than to aggravate the condition of the accused54. In another consilium of 1287, drafted 
by Lambertinus Ramponi, Antonius de Manzolinus and the judge Nicolaus de Zovenzoni, after a 
long search in the different versions of the anti-magnate ordinamenta, it is ruled that the captain 
can investigate the “receptatores bannitorum”, those who gave shelter to bandits, but cannot 
consider the witnesses cited in anonymous accusations55. These consilia are therefore placed on a 
rather thin boundary line between law and politics. The technical choices, such as the principles 
quoted to support the ruling, cannot be considered as mere professional interventions, or neutral 
applications of a Roman juridical corpus shaping the local law. The adaptation of the case to the 
Roman law principles, when explicit, turns out to be not only a juridical choice but a true act of 
policy-making.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
 
Registro 100, 1287, c. 9v, consilium by Albertus domini Odofredi, legum doctor “est tale “quod dictus Iohannes 
a Crevarcore a dicta denuntiatione facta per dictum Rainaldus absolavatur cum locatio facta dicto Iohanni de 
dictis casamentis de iure tenuit et facta fuit tempore debito”.  
54 ASBo, Capitano del Popolo ,  re. 99, 1287, c. 87v, the second part of the consilium states: “et eciam quia 
admittitur a iure ad defensionem absentis eciam qui alias iure comuni idoneus defensor non est, quia iustius 
talem admitere defensorem quam absentem et indefensum gravi condempnacione afficiere, predictis omnibus 
consideratis scilicet quod defensor in postis contentus admictatur prestita idonea satisdatione ab eo ad 
voluntatem iudicis “.  
55 ASBo, Capitano del Popolo , reg. 104, 1287, c. 14v: “quod dominus capitaneus possit suo motu inquirere contra 
tenentes et receptantes banitos pro parte Lambertaciorum; non autem possit recipere alliquos testes nominatos 
in cedulis positis in cassa continentes alliquas personas tenuisse et receptasse in domibus eorum alliquos 
bannitos pro parte Lambertaciorum”.  
 
